Berg: The stem cell debate has become something of a paradigmatic politicization of science - this is the common perception. There was hype on both sides of the embryonic stem cell debates. Many pro-lifers were admittedly drawn into the same game of over-hyping adult stem cell research. In hindsight, what could the pro-life community have done to be more effective?
Levin: It's true, the stem cell debate has been overrun with hype. The hype of embryo research advocates has been, I think, far more extensive and disingenuous, but pro-lifers were by no means immune to the tendency to overstate. I argue that part of the reason for this was a (generally healthy) tendency on our part to want to show that the debate was not necessary: that science and ethics were not necessarily at odds, and that we all shared the same ends - the pursuit of medicine - but that some means were just out of bounds. On a few occasions, perhaps the desire to show that got ahead of people's actual evidence. Fortunately for us, it seems that in the case of the stem cell debate, it is turning out to be true that non-controversial means to the same ends may be available, as we're seeing with the new reprogramming techniques. But even if that were not the case, we would still need to have the courage of our convictions and say that the destruction of nascent life for research is unacceptable. That's very difficult, and that difficulty had something to do with the tendency to make the most of every shred of evidence that alternatives might be available. That tendency does sometimes lead to hype unfortunately. We could have done a better job at arguing the ethical case on its own terms: say that the destruction of embryos is not acceptable even if there is no scientific alternative. And only then pursue alternatives. Our case is first and foremost a moral case, but of course that's not always the easiest political argument to make.
Berg: There is a common notion that a person can have a "purely scientific" point of view, a value-less point of view with regard, say, to the social implications of biotechnology. (Similarly, there's the notion that science is morally "neutral" and "above politics"). I think many in the scientific community are blind to the value-judgments they import into their beliefs about how science affects the rest of us. Would you agree?
Levin: I do agree, and this is a subject I take up at the beginning of the book. The idea that science is morally neutral - that it simply provides us with tools without directing our use of them - is very common and I think very misguided. The fact is, the scientific enterprise is constructed on a moral foundation: on a desire to empower human beings and improve human life. To say it's morally neutral is actually to sell it short. But at the same time, it also imports a great many other moral assumptions - a certain materialism, mechanism, utilitarianism, and the like - that if they go unnoticed and unbalanced can lead to some serious problems. Science has to be understood as a human endeavor with discernible ethical purposes, and so as bearing great promise and potential, but also requiring some input and oversight from the larger democratic society.
Berg: Are the scientists the "new high priests" of a "post-Judeo-Christian culture" as popular expression has it?
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Levin: Well, fortunately we are not actually living in a post-Judeo-Christian society, and so I don't think scientists have truly taken over the role of spiritual leaders, nor do I think it's a role they want. But what they have done is taken on the role of experts, and in our society expertise is valued as highly (and at times surely more so) as spiritual insight. To say that something is scientific is to say it's verified, to say, in effect, that it's true. And there's no question that we look to science for guidance in areas of life well beyond those where scientists are actually qualified to offer expertise. One of the things the book tries to do is lay out, historically and philosophically, how that might have happened.
Berg: If push comes to shove, most people would agree that there should be at least some ethical limits to certain brands of scientific endeavor and research. How are we as a culture to deal with a scientific establishment that vehemently resists such a notion? Should there be political remedies? Federal regulation? Do we need to battle to change the scientific mindset? All of the above?
Levin: You're right. The idea that there should be some limits on scientific research is not in itself a controversial idea. We see that with the near-universal acceptance of human research subject protections, for instance, and a lot of our debates are about who counts as a human subject for the purpose of such protections. But there is no question, too, that the scientific community resists any attempt to constrain its freedom of action. And as I try to show in the book, that has been the case from the very beginning. The modern age has seen a struggle for authority between science and democracy. By better understanding modern science, I think we can come to see that it is appropriately subject to the authority of our democratic institutions, even when the people in charge of those institutions are not themselves experts in the scientific fields being regulated. It's crucial to see that "science policy" is more about policy than it is about science - it is about the kinds of limits and the kinds of incentives we as a society want to establish.